A cold audit produces a dozen observations. Most tools present them as a list with red and amber badges, which is how a genuine spoofing exposure ends up ranked alongside a missing optional tag.
The only question
What does this finding permit that would otherwise be impossible? If the answer is “nothing”, it is not a finding. If the answer is “anyone can send invoices as this domain”, it goes at the top regardless of how easy it was to spot.
A ranking that holds up
| Tier | Findings | Permits |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | No DMARC record, or p=none. SPF ending +all. Dangling _domainkey CNAME into claimable infrastructure. | Authenticated or unchallenged mail as the domain, by anyone. |
| High | SPF at permerror. p=quarantine with unidentified failing sources. A forgotten p=none on a sending subdomain. | Spoofing that mostly works, or an enforcement that does not apply where it matters. |
| Medium | Enforcing with no rua. 1024-bit keys. t=y in production. Unrevoked old selectors. | No visibility, or a weakness that needs another factor to exploit. |
| Low | No MTA-STS. Missing null MX on a parked domain. No CAA. | An attack that requires a position on the network, or a gap with no current exploitation path. |
| Not a finding | Defaults not stated explicitly. ri or rf absent. No BIMI. | Nothing. |
Two ranking traps
"The SPF record is missing an ip4 for a server we found."
-> Not a finding unless that server sends. An overlong
SPF record is the more common real problem.
"p=reject is set, so email security is complete."
-> Check whether mail passes. An enforcing policy over
failing mail is an outage waiting for someone to
notice, not a finished programme.A tool score is not a ranking
Automated graders weight what they can parse, so a domain with p=reject, a 1024-bit key and three unidentified senders scores well while a domain at p=none with immaculate everything else scores badly. The second is the one anyone can spoof today.